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Renewing the Case for Regionalism: EU Transnational
Governance in an Era of Regulatory Nationalism
Diamond Ashiagbor*
A. Introduction
The EU faces a conundrum: The organization of economic activity remains transnational, whilst
the turn to populism, nationalism, and even nativism, heightens the political shift to viewing the
national level as the only legitimate site of regulation. After Brexit and in the era of Trump and
resurgent nationalism, what are the prospects for the EU to (re)gain legitimacy as a source of
transnational regulation?
The focus of this Article is on the (perceived) unresponsiveness of elite institutions, most nota-
bly the EU, to popular interests wary of globalization, from both the political left and right. The
EU has been described as a “market without a state,”1 with the concomitant problems of political
legitimacy and democratic accountability which arise when market integration and economic gov-
ernance take place at supranational level in the absence of a supranational polity. This rightly gives
rise to concerns about the viability of democratic control over capitalism. The irony is, however,
that the regionalism of the European Union is—or rather, has in the past been—an important
institutional counterpoint to, and bulwark against, the worst effects of neoliberal globalization.
B. Then: Embedding Capitalism Nationally—and Regionally
It is clear that “economic law,” in other words, law which “institutionalizes markets and provides
for their functioning,”2 and which encompasses private economic ordering—of contracts, of
corporations, of private property, of competition—as well as public ordering through social
regulation—such as product safety, environmental law, labor and social welfare law—has increa-
singly been relocated away from the state.
Historically, liberal market economies, such as those of the states of the EU, were able to estab-
lish social cohesion and solidarity, and to govern or embed capitalism, for example, in order to
enact labor standards.3 Labor law scholarship has traditionally focused on the role of the state and
its capacity, or otherwise, to regulate a territorially bounded market to socialize economic risk and
uncertainty. But capital and the sphere of economic interaction are increasingly de-territorialized.
Therefore, we also need to ask whether, from the perspective of labor regulation, economic activity
—in particular that which crosses national borders—can any longer be contained within or con-
strained by state regulation, and the attendant role of regulation on the regional or transnational
plane. Alain Supiot describes the social state as merely a mode for the realization of the objective of
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social solidarity. He talks of conceiving “an international legal order that will prohibit the use of
open borders to escape the duties of solidarity inherent in the recognition of economic and social
rights.”4
This state capacity was considerably bolstered by being part of a regional integration project,
an international legal order, namely the European Union. One might even argue that a significant
source of legitimacy for EU action was precisely its ability to institutionalize markets which are
no longer territorially bound; to embed markets at the regional level, and thus enable national,
democratic control over capitalism.
This might not have been the original understanding of the EEC project. Although ordoliberal
theory is by no means the only conception of the economy to inform European integration, it has
shaped legal discourse, in particular, in its view that the original treaties entrenched a particular
version of the free market economic constitution.5 The German ordoliberal conception of the
competitive market order argues that the economy functions best when self-coordination of eco-
nomic actors through market transactions or competition is left unimpeded by law. Whilst it did
require a coherent legal framework to guarantee individual freedoms and the economic process,
ordoliberal thinkers perceived the original Treaty of Rome, and the creation of supranational
European integration project, as “taming” the nation state in order to make the region a better
home for free-moving capital.6 The Treaty of Rome is therefore idealized by ordoliberals as the
paradigm economic constitution in that it appeared to concern exclusively economic rights; those
elements of the Treaty, as subsequently amended, which go beyond pure market integration are
considered as imperfections. Yet, it is precisely those imperfections that enable the EU regionalism
project to operate to embed capitalism. As Floris de Witte notes, contrary to the ordoliberal para-
digm, the aim of integration in the form of completion of the internal market was not to free the
economy from political constraints, “but rather to support and insulate the capacity to constrain
the economy at the national level, where sufficiently strong political structures existed.”7
Thus, whilst there are tensions between nationalism and the transnational, it is not necessarily
the case that in an era of multi-level governance, the regional or transnational is inherently about
dispossessing, disembedding, or weakening the social for the sake of the market.8
Nevertheless, is the postwar marriage of democracy and capitalism, as Wolfgang Streeck has sug-
gested,9 at an end? I would answer this question with the observation that democracy is not com-
patible with market fundamentalism, but that in the global North in the postwar era, it was, in large
part, compatible with an “embedded liberal” bargain. As Polanyi observed, “[t]he road to a free
market was opened and kept open by an enormous increase in continuous, centrally organized
and controlled interventionism;” laissez faire was planned.10 Whether within liberal market econo-
mies or coordinated market economies, there was an acceptance that capitalism or trade liberali-
zation had to be embedded in society and hence in democracy and some version of collectivism.11
Where I disagree with Streeck is in the role he attributes to supranational, regional bodies such
as the EU: Doubting the possibility of the EU project being constitutionalized, or the scope for a
4Alain Supiot, Grandeur and Misery of the Social State, 82 NEW LEFT REV. 99 (2013).
5See Wolf Sauter, The Economic Constitution of the European Union, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 27 (1998).
6SeeQUINN SLOBODIAN, GLOBALISTS: THE END OF EMPIRE AND THE BIRTH OF NEOLIBERALISM (2018); Diamond Ashiagbor,
Collective Labor Rights and the European Social Model, 3 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 222 (2009); Wolfgang Streeck, Fighting the
State, 50 DEV. & CHANGE 836 (2019) (reviewing Quinn Slobodian’s GLOBALISTS).
7Floris de Witte, The Architecture of the EU’s Social Market Economy, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF THE EU’S
INTERNAL MARKET (Panos Koutrakos & Jukka Snell eds., 2017).
8Article 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), as inserted by the Lisbon Treaty, 2009, commits the Union to creat-
ing “a highly competitive social market economy.” But see below.
9WOLFGANG STREECK, HOW WILL CAPITALISM END?: ESSAYS ON A FAILING SYSTEM (2016).
10KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 147, 156 (1944).
11John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic
Order, 36 INT’L ORG. 379 (1982).
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supranational democracy to emerge from international capitalism.12 Nevertheless, this rejection of
the region as a legitimate site of regulation ignores the history of how for industrialized economies
of the global North, including those in Europe, the protection of society from the market occurred
due to the evolution in the protective capacities of individual states, but crucially also the evolution
in the protective capacities of the region.
C. Now: The EU’s Role in Hastening the Disembedding of Capitalism
The period during which the EU integration project and, in particular, its social policy, served as a
bulwark to the ability of member states to embed the market, has come to an abrupt end—ironi-
cally, at the same time that the Treaties commit the Union to creating “a highly competitive social
market economy.”13 The response of EU institutions to the sovereign debt crisis has led to a weak-
ening of social and labor rights, and an erosion of social solidarity, which has contributed to the
intensification of populist tendencies.14 Long before this current crisis, the Lisbon Strategy, the
Employment Strategy, and the “open method of coordination” (OMC)15 can be said to have
undermined the very social objectives which might ameliorate the operation of markets. The back-
ground values and norms of EU economic policy in general, and the Stability and Growth Pact
and Economic andMonetary Union in particular,16 constrain national employment and economic
policy and necessitate strict fiscal discipline, restrictions on public expenditure, modernization of
social protection systems, and structural reforms to make labor markets economically responsive
and enhance their competitiveness. As van Apeldoorn observes, such asymmetric multilevel gov-
ernance ensures that socio-economic policy-making is structurally biased towards policies of neo-
liberal restructuring.17
Social objectives and governance have lost way to, and been subsumed within, the broader
economic policy governance of the European Semester: An annual cycle of coordination and sur-
veillance of the EU’s economic policies, involving detailed scrutiny of Member States’ plans for
macroeconomic, budgetary, and structural reforms.18 An optimistic reading is that economic pol-
icy coordination has been “socialized” with social policy objectives—for example, poverty and
social inclusion—increasingly being included in the—relatively “hard law”—institutional and
12STREECK, supra note 9, at 198.
13See Gareth Dale & Nadine El-Enany, The Limits to Social Europe: EU Law and the Ordoliberal Agenda, 14 GERMAN L.J.
613 (2013). Where I differ from the assessment offered by Dale and El-Enany is in the extent to which ordoliberalism can be
said to be dominant in the middle period of European integration. I would, though, agree that since the Lisbon Treaty—and,
before that, the Lisbon Strategy in relation to employment and economic policy—neoliberalism and ordoliberalism have been
in the ascendancy.
14Claire Kilpatrick, The Displacement of Social Europe: A Productive Lens of Inquiry, 14 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 62 (2018); see
also Claire Kilpatrick, Abnormal Legal Sources and Institutional Actions in the EU Sovereign Debt Crisis, in LEGAL ACTS IN THE
EU: CHALLENGES AND TRANSFORMATION 70 (Marise Cremona & Claire Kilpatrick eds., 2018).
15The European Employment Strategy was launched in 1997 with the goal of a high level of employment, to be achieved
through what became known as the open method of coordination: An annual, iterative procedure using soft law to improve
the efficiency of labor markets through the setting of guidelines, benchmarks, and indicators at the European level, their trans-
lation into national policies, and the periodic monitoring of such implementation, mostly by means of peer review.
PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS, LISBON EUROPEAN COUNCIL (Mar. 23–24, 2000), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/
lis1_en.htm.
16Enforced through multilateral surveillance and the excessive deficit procedure—the “3 percent budget deficit rule.”
17Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, The Contradictions of “Embedded Neoliberalism” and Europe’s Multilevel Legitimacy Crisis: The
European Project and Its Limits, in CONTRADICTIONS AND LIMITS OF NEOLIBERAL EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE: FROM LISBON TO
LISBON (Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, Jan Drahokoupil & Laura Horn eds., 2008).
18The priority of the European Semester, introduced in 2010, is fiscal stability and debt reduction which, it is argued, will
“create the conditions for more and better jobs, greater social fairness, and better living standards for Europeans.” European
Commission Press Release IP/18/6462, European Semester Autumn Package: Bolstering Inclusive and Sustainable Growth
(Nov. 21, 2018). See Kilpatrick, supra note 14; Mark Dawson, New Governance and the Displacement of Social Europe:
The Case of the European Semester, 14 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 191 (2018).
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policy framework of the European Semester.19 A more convincing reading, however, is that EU
social policy lacks autonomy and is increasingly contained within an institutional framework,
which requires such policy to be “growth–friendly” and to ensure fiscal stability. Rather than
shielding workers—and others—from the market, the aim of EU social policy becomes to facili-
tate their operation in the market whilst also facilitating market integration.20
And the role of the EU in exacerbating such disembedding—in urging the retrenchment of
national welfare states, in downgrading the redistributive aspirations of social policy, and in
the general incursions against labor law and labor market institutions—ensures it is a strong target
for anti-globalization sentiment.
D. Next: A Category Error — Market Fundamentalism Turned Inwards
The resistance from countries in the global South to forms of transnational regulation, for example
of the sort imposed by structural adjustment, is now, through curious reversal, being mirrored by
opposition to transnational regulation in countries in the global North. The slogan of the Leave
campaign in the UK, advocating the UK’s exit from the European Union, was “take back control;”
that resonated with the claim of Donald Trump to “Make America Great Again” and to place
“America First.” Both sets of slogans imply a nostalgia, or rather a fantasy, for a lost state:
One which is fully sovereign, unfettered by international or supranational obligations, freed from
the constraints of a liberalized global trading regime, whose rules it had been responsible for craft-
ing, and—most significantly—almost entirely free from migrants.
One of the examples of the unease being expressed by observers in the global North is in relation
to mega-regional trade agreements, such as the now-defunct Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP).21 TTIP, if ratified, would have imposed an investment law regime stripping
these sovereign states of their policy space and regulatory autonomy, and doing so in a manner
reminiscent of the experience of states of the global South, which witnessed investment treaty law
and bilateral agreements as a continuation of predatory capitalism and neocolonialism in a supposed
postcolonial era. There is a similar symmetry between the deregulatory reform policies being imposed
on those EUmember states receiving financial support from the Troika of the EuropeanCommission,
European Central Bank and IMF, and the effect of structural adjustment programs implemented
by the IMF and the World Bank on markets in developing states from the 1970s onwards. In both
cases—neocolonial trade agreements compared with the new wave of “mega-regional” agreements
and structural adjustment compared with austerity as a response to sovereign debt crisis—the
techniques of neoliberal governance are following a pattern first trialed on the global South.
European states are experiencing this as a category error, in part because they have not been on
the receiving end of such policies, but most importantly because it is the rest of the world which
has been subject to the economic power of their corporations and investment law regimes.
This market fundamentalism is now turned inwards on the EU states themselves. Whether we
agree with Hien and Joerges that Anglo-American neoliberalism rather than German ordoliber-
alism has been in the ideational driver’s seat of EU economic policy since the 1980s,22 it is clear
19Jonathan Zeitlin & Bart Vanhercke, Economic Governance in Europe 2020: Socialising the European Semester Against the
Odds?, in SOCIAL POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNIONS: STATE OF PLAY 65 (David Natali & Bart Vanhercke eds., 2015).
20As I’ve argued elsewhere, the Lisbon Strategy and the “open method of coordination” essentially ushered in or reinforced
a version of EU social policy which is predicated on equalizing the marketability and employability of individuals in the mar-
ket, rather than protecting them from the market. DIAMOND ASHIAGBOR, THE EUROPEAN EMPLOYMENT STRATEGY: LABOUR
MARKET REGULATION AND NEW GOVERNANCE 6, 71 (2005); Dawson, supra note 18, at 193.
21A 2019 Council Decision states that the negotiating directives for the TTIP are obsolete and no longer relevant. Council
Decision 6052/19 of Apr. 9, 2019 Authorising the Opening of Negotiations with the United States of America for an
Agreement on the Elimination of Tariffs for Industrial Goods.
22Josef Hien & Christian Joerges, Dead Man Walking? Current European Interest in the Ordoliberal Tradition, 24 EUR. L. J.
142 (2018).
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that the original imperatives behind Europe’s economic constitution have returned with a ven-
geance. A major challenge for the 2020s is whether the EU can finally address the question of
what it means to construct a polity that proceeds from economic rationality to social justice.
At certain points in its evolution, it has been able to adopt alternative visions of the economy,
which do allow for the possibility of market–correcting intervention. Nonetheless, on current
form—illustrated by neoliberal responses to the present crises—it is difficult to envisage how
the EU can succeed in institutionalizing a labor or social constitution (Arbeitsverfassung) to hold
in check or counter the emergence of an economic constitution (Wirtschaftsverfassung).23
Streeck argues that democracy can be made compatible with contemporary capitalism, but only
by safeguarding or shielding the redistributive potential of democratic politics from the worse
aspects of free markets, from financialized disembedded capitalism. The surrendering of state
sovereignty to global finance capital and the withdrawal of the EU from its sometimes role in
supporting such state capacity certainly makes it much more difficult to create or maintain demo-
cratically determined collective values and institutions.
23The idea of the economic constitution (Wirtschaftsverfassung) can be understood in opposition to the social or labor
constitution (Arbeitsverfassung) tradition that Hugo Sinzheimer and others had identified during the short years of the
Weimar Republic. See Ruth Dukes, The Economic Sociology of Labour Law 46 J.L. & SOC’Y 396 (2019).
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